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Williams v. Ward: Compromising the
Constitutional Right to Prompt Determination
of Probable Cause Upon Arrest
Individuals arrested and imprisoned for up to three days
without a probable cause hearing to determine the legality of
their detention, brought suit against New York City alleging a
violation of their constitutional rights.1 The plaintiff class
claimed that this seventy-two hour detention was an unconsti-
tutional violation of its fourth and fourteenth amendment
rights because it constituted an unreasonable seizure and denial
of due process of law.2 One of the city's justifications for its
lengthy detention was that it provided additional benefits to ar-
restees such as the opportunity to consult counsel, the setting
of pretrial release conditions, and the use of the plea bargaining
process.3 The city also argued that it might drop charges
against some suspects during the detention period, thus mitigat-
ing the deprivation.4 The United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York held that detaining a person ar-
rested without a warrant for longer than twenty-four hours
without a judicial determination of probable cause violates the
fourth amendment. 5 The court enjoined New York City from
detaining any arrestee beyond a twenty-four hour period with-
1. Williams v. Ward, 845 F.2d 374, 375 (2d Cir. 1988), cert denied, 109 S.
Ct. 818 (1989). The plaintiffs brought a class action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(1986). Currently, a person arrested without a warrant in New York City first
appears before a judicial officer at arraignment in the city's criminal court.
The court makes a probable cause determination at this time. This process,
however, may take up to three days, during which all arrestees are detained in
the local jail. Williams, 845 F.2d at 375.
2. Id The fourth amendment grants individuals the right to "be secure
in their persons . . .against unreasonable searches and seizures" and states
that any warrants must be based on a probable cause standard. U.S. CONST.
amend. IV. The fourteenth amendment's guarantee that no state can deprive
"any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law" extends
the protections of the fourth amendment to individuals in circumstances in-
volving state action (including police actions). W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, CRIMI-
NAL PROCEDURE 34-35 (student ed. 1985).
3. Williams, 845 F.2d at 387.
4. Id
5. Williams v. Ward, 671 F. Supp. 225, 226 (S.D.N.Y. 1987), rev'd, 845 F.2d
374 (2d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 818 (1989).
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out a probable cause hearing before a state judge.6 In Williams
v. Ward,7 the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed,
holding that a pretrial detention of up to seventy-two hours is
constitutionally permissible in New York City, primarily be-
cause of the additional procedural benefits the city provided
arrestees.
8
The Williams decision raises an issue critical to our crimi-
nal justice system: the constitutionally permissible length of
time law enforcement officers may detain a person following a
warrantless arrest before a judicial officer determines whether
there is probable cause to hold the arrestee in custody. This is-
sue is critical because even though the Constitution provides
each citizen the right to be free from unreasonable and un-
founded charges of criminal activity,9 an individual's liberty,
family, and job still may be at risk when the law allows an in-
nocent person to be arrested and imprisoned for up to three
days before a probable cause determination.1 0 To maintain the
precarious balance between an individual's right to liberty and
society's need to control crime, the judiciary must establish
guidelines. 1
This Comment examines the Second Circuit's attempt in
Williams to balance individual interests in liberty with state
interests in procedural efficiency within the complex structure
of New York City's criminal procedure system. Part I provides
social and legal perspectives on detention of arrestees without a
judicial probable cause determination. Part II details the Wil-
liams decision. Part III critiques the court's reasoning and con-
siders whether providing additional procedural benefits to
arrestees sufficiently compensates them for their detention of
up to seventy-two hours before judicial review of probable
cause. This Comment concludes that the fourth amendment
guarantee of a determination of probable cause for arrest
"promptly" after a warrantless arrest requires, at a minimum, a
nonadversarial ex parte hearing within twenty-four hours fol-
lowing the arrest, irrespective of any additional procedural ben-
efits provided.
6. Id at 227.
7. 845 F.2d 374 (2d Cir. 1988), cert denied, 109 S. Ct. 818 (1989).
8. Id- at 388.
9. See supra note 2.
10. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 114 (1975).
11. Id. at 111-12 (noting the value of judicial establishment of the probable
cause standard for arrest).
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I. PROBABLE CAUSE DETERMINATION:
INTERPRETING THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
THROUGH GERSTEIN
A. IN CONFLICT: LIBERTY V. CRIME CONTROL
Governments historically have wrestled with the difficult
task of balancing the individual's right to liberty with society's
need to control crime.12 In considering this balancing problem,
Justice Frankfurter once noted that "[t]he history of liberty has
largely been the history of observance of procedural safe-
guards."1 3 Common law procedure long required that the ar-
restee be brought before a justice of the peace, soon after
arrest.14 The justice of the peace met separately with the pris-
oner and witnesses and determined whether there was reason
to believe that the arrestee had committed a crime.15 If evi-
dence of guilt was insufficient, the arrestee was released.16
The Supreme Court has noted that this common law sys-
tem served as the model for the seizure procedure conceived by
the framers of the Bill of Rights.' 7 Building on the common
law and incorporating substantive constitutional guarantees,
states have developed complex systems of criminal procedure.
Presently, federal and state regulations provide strict guide-
lines for every aspect of the crime control process.' 8
At the heart of the conflict between liberty and crime con-
trol is the fourth amendment, a procedural safeguard requiring
that all searches and seizures be reasonable and that all war-
12. See, e.g., id. The Court in Gerstein noted that the probable cause stan-
dard for arrest, defined by the facts and circumstances which allow a "reason-
ably prudent person" to believe that the individual under suspicion has
committed or is committing a crime, represents "a necessary accommodation
between the individual's right to liberty and the State's duty to control crime."
Id-
13. McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 347 (1943).
14. 2 M. HALE, PLEAS OF THE CROWN 77, 81, 95, 121 (1736); 2 W. HAWKINS,
PLEAS OF THE CROWN 116-17 (4th ed. 1762).
15. 1 M. HALE, supra note 14, at 583-86; 2 W. HAWKINS, supra note 14, at
116-19; 1 J. STEPHEN, HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 233 (1883).
The motivation for this prompt action was concern over allowing offenders to
escape if they committed a crime, and fear of liability if they had not. 1 M.
HALE, supra note 14, at 589-90.
16. 1 J. STEPHEN, supra note 15, at 233.
17. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 116 (1975).
18. These guidelines detail the individual's rights and a law enforcement
agency's obligations for each step, including- arrest, booking, detention, first
appearance or presentment, arraignment, preliminary hearing, trial, convic-
tion, and appeal. W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, supra note 2, at 7-19.
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rants be based on probable cause.19 Recognizing the impor-
tance of the opposing interests of an individual's constitutional
right to liberty and the state's duty to control crime through ar-
rests, the Supreme Court looks to the fourth amendment to es-
tablish a compromise as guidance for lower courts.20 In
Gerstein v. Pugh,2 ' the Court defined the compromise of the
fourth amendment as allowing police to detain briefly even
those arrested without a warrant to complete the essential "ad-
ministrative steps incident to arrest. '2 2
B. PUBLIC POLICY UNDERLYING THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
Demanding probable cause as the minimum standard for
arrest is the initial step in a complex system of criminal law
and procedure designed to safeguard the rights of one accused
of criminal behavior.2 3 The Supreme Court has interpreted the
fourth amendment to require a "prompt" judicial determina-
tion of probable cause after a warrantless arrest.2 In Gerstein
the Supreme Court held that the fourth amendment requires a
nonadversarial ex parte determination of probable cause for
arrest by a neutral judicial officer2 prior to any "extended re-
19. The Constitution provides for "[t]he right of the people to be secure in
their persons ... against unreasonable searches and seizures," and that "no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause." U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
20. Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 111-12. Courts generally have interpreted the
compromise to permit warrantless detention of no more than one day. See,
e.g., Bernard v. City of Palo Alto, 699 F.2d 1023, 1025 (9th Cir. 1983) (per
curiam) (establishing a benchmark time period of 24 hours as ample time to
complete these administrative steps in all but extreme cases, for which the
court could grant approval for justified delays); Sanders v. Houston, 543 F.
Supp. 694, 701 (S.D. Tex. 1982) (maintaining that even though the rights of a
suspect are subject to limitations arising out of society's interest in controlling
crime, "the individual's interest once in custody is paramount, and such inter-
est cannot be undercut by arbitrary and protracted police procedures"), aff'd
mem, 741 F.2d 1379 (5th Cir. 1984); Lively v. Cullinane, 451 F. Supp. 1000,
1005-06 (D.D.C. 1978) (holding that once the police efficiently fulfill their ad-
ministrative needs, the fourth amendment intervenes and detention is no
longer justified).
21. 420 U.S. 103 (1975).
22. Id at 114.
23. Id at 125 n.27.
24. ML at 125.
25. This requirement is not new. In Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10
(1948), the Court stated:
The point of the Fourth Amendment, which often is not grasped
by zealous officers, is not that it denies law enforcement the support
of the usual inferences which reasonable men draw from evidence.
Its protection consists in requiring that those inferences be drawn by
a neutral and detached magistrate instead of being judged by the of-
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straint of liberty following arrest. '26 Gerstein requires that
the determination be made "either before or promptly after
arrest."
2 7
The Gerstein court emphasized the tragic economic, social,
and physical consequences resulting from unwarranted confine-
ment.28 The arrestee, detained for two or more days, may be
fired from employment, terminating much needed income.29
Marital and family relationships become strained, creating ten-
sions and problems that undermine family stability.30 The so-
cial stigma of imprisonment also damages an arrestee's
reputation, even when the unwarranted detention is brief.3 1
The emotional toll on a person detained in jail is high - con-
sisting of humiliation, anxiety, and disgrace.3 2 The violence and
crime prevalent inside prisons also exact a physical toll.3 3 The
overcrowded, generally poor living conditions of most jails pro-
vide numerous risks for detained arrestees, including injury or
ficer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out
crime.
Id. at 13-14.
26. 420 U.S. at 113-14. This decision specifically addressed situations
where no warrants had been issued prior to the arrest. The Court felt that "a
policeman's on-the-scene assessment of probable cause provides legal justifica-
tion for arresting a person suspected of crime, and for a brief period of deten-
tion to take the administrative steps incident to arrest." Id.
27. Id, at 125 (emphasis added). The Court established that it is the duty
of each state to provide an equitable and reliable determination of probable
cause by judicial review as a prerequisite for any significant pretrial detention.
28. Id at 114. See also Sanders v. Houston, 543 F. Supp. 694, 702 (S.D.
Tex. 1982) (observing that "unfounded interference with liberty can take a dis-
astrous toll on one's life"), aff'd mem., 741 F.2d 1379 (5th Cir. 1984). Deten-
tion infringes on individual liberty interests, restricting physical movement
and limiting the ability to carry on with daily life. Lively v. Cullinane, 451 F.
Supp. 1000, 1005 (D.D.C. 1978).
29. 420 U.S. at 114.
30. Id. The Gerstein Court emphasized its concern about prolonged de-
tention, noting that "pretrial confinement may imperil the suspect's job, inter-
rupt his source of income, and impair his family relationships." Id.
31. Lively, 451 F. Supp. at 1005. The Lively court felt that the police,
lacking sensitivity to the numerous problems of an arrestee in pre-present-
ment confinement, were not efficient when performing the "administrative
steps incident to arrest." Id. The court emphasized that social stigma attaches
even to a brief confinement. Id.
32. Berdon, Liberty and Property Under the Procedural Due Process
Clause: The Requirement of an Adversary Hearing to Determine Probable
Cause, 53 CoNN. B.J. 31, 44 (1979) (arguing that pretrial detainees often are
"confined under conditions which are more oppressive and restrictive than
those applied to convicted and sentenced felons").
33. Zilversmit, Granting Prosecutors'Requests for Continuances of Deten-
tion Hearings, 39 STAN. L. REV. 761, 780 (1987).
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even death at the hands of other inmatesM4 Both guilty and in-
nocent arrestees are exposed to these poor conditions. 35 Expos-
ing those arrested for misdemeanor offenses to these conditions
is particularly inappropriate.3 6 In such cases, the arrest and de-
tention are a greater punishment than the mandated penalty
upon conviction.37 Gerstein thus recognizes that in today's soci-
ety, prolonged pretrial detention can disrupt a person's life
even more than the arrest itself.38
Due to the severe toll exacted on arrestees who are de-
tained excessively, determining probable cause promptly is an
important constitutional requirement of the criminal justice
system.39 Because the Supreme Court in Gerstein did not de-
fine the term "promptly" specifically, however, that determina-
tion is left to the lower courts.
34. Id. Those in detention may be beaten, raped, murdered, or driven to
suicide. Id. See also Berdon, supra note 32, at 45 (describing irreparable
harms resulting from pretrial detention).
35. Gramenos v. Jewel Cos., 797 F.2d 432, 437 (7th Cir. 1986), cert denied,
481 U.S. 1028 (1987).
36. Id at 441. Typically, the court imposes a fine or probation as punish-
ment for misdemeanors. Id.
37. Ia In United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411 (1975), Justice Marshall
observed:
[A]n unjustified arrest that forces the individual temporarily to forfeit
his right to control his person and movements and interrupts the
course of his daily business may be more intrusive than an unjustified
search. "Being arrested and held by the police, even if for a few
hours, is, for most persons, awesome and frightening. Unlike other
occasions on which one may be authoritatively required to be some-
where or do something, an arrest abruptly subjects a person to con-
straint, and removes him to unfamiliar and threatening surroundings.
Moreover, this exercise of control over the person depends not just on
his willingness to comply with an impersonal directive, such as a sum-
mons or subpoena, but on an order which a policeman issues on the
spot and stands ready then and there to back up with force. The se-
curity of the individual requires that so abrupt and intrusive an au-
thority be granted to public officials only on a guarded basis."
Ia at 446 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGN-
MENT PROCEDURE Commentary 290-91 (offical draft 1975)).
38. 420 U.S. at 114 (1975). The Court observed that "[t]he consequences of
prolonged detention may be more serious than the interference occasioned by
arrest." Id-
39. Id- at 114. "The Fourth Amendment was tailored explicitly for the
criminal justice system, and its balance between individual and public interests
always has been thought to define the 'process that is due' for seizures of per-
son or property in criminal cases, including the detention of suspects pending
trial." Id. at 125 n.27.
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C. REASONABLENESS AND PROMPTNESS UNDER GERSTEIN
1. Code and Rule Treatment
Both the Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure 40 and
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 41 provide guidelines
for the length of time an arrestee can be detained after a war-
rantless arrest and before a probable cause determination. The
Model Code states that two hours is sufficient to complete the
administrative steps needed to process a nonviolent misde-
meanor arrestee.4 The Model Code also requires that a person
arrested without a warrant be brought before a judicial officer
for a hearing as early as possible after arrest and in any event
within twenty-four hours of the arrest.43 If this appearance
before a judicial officer has not taken place within twenty-four
hours, the arrestee must be released with a citation or on bail. 4
The magistrate is authorized, but not required, to make the
40. MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE §§ 130.2(1), 310.1 (of-
ficial draft 1975) [hereinafter MODEL CODE].
41. FED. R. CRIM. P. 5(a); see also Lively v. Cullinane, 451 F. Supp. 1000,
1004 (D.D.C. 1978) (interpreting Rule 5(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure to imply the necessity of arraignment without unnecessary delay);
Seventeenth Annual Review of Criminal Procedure: United States Supreme
Court and Courts of Appeals 1986-1987. Investigation and Police Practices, 76
GEO. L.J. 521, 777-79 (1988) (reviewing general standard for the initial appear-
ance of an arrestee before a magistrate).
42. The Model Code provides:
[Not later than [two] hours after an arrested person is brought to the
police station the station officer shall make one of the following
dispositions:
(a) If the station officer concludes that there is no reasonable cause to
believe that the arrested person has committed a crime .... the sta-
tion officer shall order the arrested person released forthwith.
(b) If... the prosecuting attorney advises the station officer that he
intends to charge such person with a crime ... the station officer
shall, in any case where authorized to do so release the arrested per-
son on his own recognizance or admit him to bail. If the arrested per-
son is not released, he shall be brought before a judicial officer
without unnecessary delay.
(c) If none of the actions referred to . . . above, have been taken
within said [two-hour] period, the station officer shall release the ar-
rested person.
MODEL CODE, supra note 40, § 130.2(1) (emphasis added).
43. The Model Code states:
[A]ny person who has been arrested and has not been released by the
station officer.., shall be brought before a court at the earliest time
after the arrest that a judicial officer of such court is available and in
any event within 24 hours after the arrest. If such appearance has not
taken place within 24 hours after his arrest, such person shall be re-
leased with a citation or on bail.




probable cause determination within this twenty-four hour pe-
riod.4 5 If probable cause is not found lacking at the arrestee's
first appearance, the arrestee will be detained until the session
is reconvened within two court days for the presentation of
written and testimonial evidence on the issue of probable
cause.
46
In contrast, the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure re-
quire that the probable cause determination for a warrantless
arrest be made at the arrestee's initial appearance before a
magistrate, which takes place "without unnecessary delay" fol-
lowing the arrest.4 7 The rules provide no specific time frame
for guidance.48 The phrase "without unnecessary delay," how-
ever, reflects concern with excessive detention and gives rise to
an expectation that any detention prior to the probable cause
determination will be brief.4 9
2. Judicial Interpretation of the Gerstein Standard
The Supreme Court has not spoken on the issue of what is
"prompt" under Gerstein except with respect to juveniles. In
Schall v. Martin,50 the Court held that a detention of up to
three days without a determination of probable cause was con-
stitutional, where the purpose of the detention was to prevent
the juvenile from committing more criminal acts.51 The Court
45. Id. § 310.1(6) (stating that "[t]he court need not determine whether
there is reasonable cause to believe the arrested person committed the crime
of which he is accused").
46. Id. § 310.2(1) (providing that an adjourned session of the first appear-
ance for persons in custody "shall be granted only in exceptional circum-
stances and shall not exceed an additional 48 hours").
47. FED. R. CRIM. P. 5(a). The rule states that
any person making an arrest without a warrant shall take the ar-
rested person without unnecessary delay before the nearest available
federal magistrate or, in the event that a federal magistrate is not rea-
sonably available, before a state or local judicial officer... If a person
arrested without a warrant is brought before a magistrate, a com-
plaint shall be filed forthwith which shall comply with... respect to
the showing of probable cause.
Id. (emphasis added).
48. Id.
49. See Sanders v. Houston, 543 F. Supp. 694, 702 (S.D. Tex. 1982) (holding
that arrestees must be brought before a judicial officer as soon as possible to
comply with Rule 5(a) or, in any event, not later than 24 hours after arrest),
aff'd mem, 741 F.2d 1379 (5th Cir. 1984).
50. 467 U.S. 253 (1984).
51. Id. at 275-76. The Court held that the Family Court Act does not re-
quire a probable cause determination at a juvenile's first appearance before a
judicial officer. The court explained that preventive detention is not a viola-
tion of due process rights because preventing crime is a legitimate and compel-
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in Schall determined that a juvenile is entitled to a formal, ad-
versarial probable cause hearing within three days of an initial
appearance in family court.52 The initial appearance may be
adjourned for up to seventy-two hours or until the next court
day, whichever is sooner, to enable an appointed law guardian
or counsel to appear before the court.53
Although Schall addressed pretrial detention prior to prob-
able cause determination, 4 the Court's primary focus was to
determine the constitutionality of a statute dealing with pre-
ventive detention 55 of juveniles56 after an initial appearance.
The decision left to the lower courts the task of establishing a
permissible timeframe for the administrative detention of
adults arrested without a warrant.
The federal courts consistently have held that Gerstein al-
lows detention of arrestees only for the time required to com-
plete the "administrative steps incident to arrest."57  The
simplest definition of the "steps incident to arrest" is the time
ling state interest. Id at 266. The Court also noted that "juveniles, unlike
adults, are always in some form of custody" of either their parents or the state,
acting as parens patriae. Id- at 265. The Court reasoned that the detention
protected both the juvenile and the community. Id at 266.
52. Id at 275. The Court observed that a juvenile is provided more
predetention protection through an adversarial hearing than is an adult under
the Gerstein standard for probable cause determination. Id. Gerstein provides
that a probable cause determination may be nonadversarial. Gerstein v. Pugh,
420 U.S. 103, 119-23 (1975).
53. Schall, 467 U.S. at 275. At this time the court informs the juvenile of
the formal charges and of the right to challenge them. Id
54. The Schall Court was concerned with the legality of a juvenile's de-
tention after the initial appearance and before the fact-finding hearing. Id. at
269-70.
55. Preventive detention is permitted if the suspect is considered highly
dangerous, likely to commit future crimes, or likely to flee or otherwise ob-
struct justice. W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, supra note 2, at 544-45.
56. The Schall Court explained that the Constitution does not require
identical treatment of adults and juveniles. 467 U.S. at 263.
57. See, e.g., Bernard v. City of Palo Alto, 699 F.2d 1023, 1025 (9th Cir.
1983) (per curiam) (holding that the state must complete administrative steps
and determine probable cause within 24 hours of arrest); Mabry v. County of
Kalamazoo, 626 F. Supp. 912, 914 (W.D. Mich. 1986) (finding that warrantless
detention beyond the time needed to take administrative steps incident to
arrest violates arrestee's constitutional rights); Sanders v. City of Houston, 543
F. Supp. 694, 702 (S.D. Tex. 1982) (holding that an arrestee must be brought
before a judicial officer as soon as possible after the completion of the neces-
sary administrative steps, but not later than 24 hours (including weekends and
holidays) after arrest), aff'd mem., 741 F.2d 1379 (5th Cir. 1984); Lively v. Cul-
linane, 451 F. Supp. 1000, 1004 (D.D.C. 1978) (holding that the state may delay
probable cause determination only for the time reasonably necessary for police
to process an arrestee).
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required to "book,"'5 8 or administratively process, an arrestee
after arrival at the police station.59 This definition leads to in-
consistent results, however, because each jurisdiction decides
independently60 what period of time is appropriate for booking
an arrestee in that particular jurisdiction. 61
The emphasis courts place on administrative details evi-
dences their concern with the low priority police place on the
urgency of an individual's fourth amendment right to a prob-
able cause determination.62 The court in Gramenos v. Jewel
58. "Booking" is the administrative step undertaken after the arrestee is
brought to the police station. It includes identification of the suspect and re-
cording the crime for which the individual was arrested. Fingerprinting and
photographing also may be a part of this procedure. BLACK'S LAw DICTION-
ARY 166 (5th ed. 1979).
59. Bernard v. City of Palo Alto, 699 F.2d 1023, 1024 (9th Cir. 1983) (per
curiam).
60. Sanders v. City of Houston, 543 F. Supp. 694, 700 (S.D. Tex. 1982),
aff'd mem, 741 F.2d 1379 (5th Cir. 1984). Depending on a particular jurisdic-
tion, the "steps incident to arrest" could include any or all of the following.
completing paperwork, searching the suspect, inventorying property, finger-
printing, photographing, checking for a prior record, laboratory testing, inter-
rogation, verifying alibis, conducting line-ups, or ascertaining any similarity to
other related crimes. Id
61. Fingerprinting, a time consuming process, is one of the "steps" caus-
ing controversy in some jurisdictions. See, e.g., Doulin v. City of Chicago, 662 F.
Supp. 318, 332 (N.D. M. 1986), rev'd on other grounds sub non. Robinson v.
City of Chicago, 868 F.2d 959 (7th Cir. 1989). Generally, a fingerprint is taken
at the police station and then sent either by mail (taking several hours, but
delivering a clearer print) or by facsimile machine to the identification section
of the police department. It then is identified and matched by a computer to a
number used in compiling an arrest history of an individual. After the print is
verified, a copy of the record ("rap sheet") is sent back to the police station. Id.
at 323.
The Doulin court found that a fingerprint clearing policy, which matched
an arrestee's fingerprints with those on record for past criminal activity, un-
constitutionally infringed on the rights of misdemeanor arrestees who are to
be presented promptly to a judge or magistrate for a probable cause hearing.
Id at 324. The court reasoned that the practical effects of fingerprint clearing
unjustifiably exceeded the "brief period" needed to complete the "administra-
tive steps incident to arrest" where other faster methods were available to ac-
quire essential information. Id. The court also observed that, because many of
those arrested for misdemeanors had no previous record, the fingerprint clear-
ing procedure actually took longer (up to 12 hours) than for those with a crim-
inal record. Id. at 322.
62. See, e.g., Lively v. Cullinane, 451 F. Supp. 1000, 1009 (D.D.C. 1978)
(concluding that police detained arrestees for no substantial administrative or
safety reasons). The Lively court observed that the District of Columbia po-
lice failed even to consider the time of the suspect's arrest when fingerprinting
or photographing, consequently leading to longer periods of detention prior to
probable cause determination. Id. at 1007.
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Cos.,63 for example, went so far as to assert that the perform-
ance of time-consuming administrative tasks after an arrest
should be performed on the police officer's time, not the sus-
pect's time.64 Instead of lengthy detention, said the court, the
police should issue a citation and release the suspect.65
Courts examine police efficiency in performing the admin-
istrative steps incident to arrest, along with the reasonableness
of any delay in determining probable cause, to decide whether
an arrestee's fourth amendment rights have been violated.66
Many courts have interpreted this time requirement to be
twenty-four hours or less.67
Dommer v. Hatcher,68 decided shortly after Gerstein,69 re-
lied on Gerstein in stating that, unless police make a prompt
determination of probable cause, "the foundations of criminal
justice will crumble under the weight of police and/or
63. 797 F.2d 432 (7th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1028 (1987).
64. Id. at 437.
65. Id.
66. See, e.g., Gramenos v. Jewel Cos., 797 F.2d 433, 437 (7th Cir. 1986) (de-
termining that as soon as police complete post-arrest administrative steps, they
must take the suspect before a magistrate to establish probable cause or must
release the suspect). The Gramenos court remanded the case to ascertain if a
four hour delay in the determination of probable cause was excessive in a non-
violent misdemeanor case. Id. See also Llaguno v. Mingey, 763 F.2d 1560, 1568
(7th Cir. 1985) (holding that 42 hours exceeds constitutional limits); Mabry v.
County of Kalamazoo, 626 F. Supp. 912, 917 (W.D. Mich. 1986) (finding war-
rantless detention of 60 hours excessive).
67. See, e.g., Bernard v. City of Palo Alto, 699 F.2d 1023, 1025 (9th Cir.
1983) (per curiam) (determining that the state must hold a probable cause
hearing within 24 hours of arrest); Mabry v. County of Kalamazoo, 626 F.
Supp. 912, 915 (W.D. Mich. 1986) (finding that warrantless detention of 24
hours without probable cause determination would provide a close question as
to the violation of arrestee's constitutional rights); Sanders v. City of Houston,
543 F. Supp. 694, 702 (S.D. Tex. 1982) (holding that an arrestee must be
brought before a judicial officer as soon as possible, but not later than 24 hours
after arrest, including weekends and holidays), aff'd mem., 741 F.2d 1379 (5th
Cir. 1984); Lively v. Cullinane, 451 F. Supp. 1000, 1007 (D.D.C. 1978) (holding
that probable cause determination can be delayed only for the time reasonably
necessary for police to process an arrestee).
68. 427 F. Supp. 1040 (N.D. Ind. 1975), rev'd in part on other grounds sub
non. Dommer v. Crawford, 653 F.2d 289 (7th Cir. 1981) (per curiam). Dommer
involved detention for investigative purposes. Id at 1045. The court concluded
that "if further investigation is needed after the arrest, the police have ar-
rested without the requisite probable cause and the individual must be re-
leased." Id
69. Dommer was originally decided on July 25, 1975. 1& at 1040. Gerstein




prosecutorial authority."70 The court in Dommer, relying on
the Gerstein interpretation of the fourth amendment and an
Indiana statute that required a magistrate to review the basis
for detaining anyone for longer than twenty-four hours,71 held
that a court must make a probable cause determination within
twenty-four hours of arrest, excluding Sundays.72
More recent federal cases have settled on a twenty-four
hour standard.7 3 In Bernard v. City of Palo Alto,74 the Ninth
Circuit decided that a maximum period of twenty-four hours
from the time of arrest provided adequate time for a neutral
magistrate to determine probable cause.75 The court thought
that this time period would be sufficient to complete the "ad-
ministrative steps incident to arrest" in all but extreme cases.
76
The court reasoned that the arrestee's constitutional interest in
not being detained, absent a finding of probable cause, out-
weighs the state's interest in administrative efficiency.77 The
Bernard court interpreted Gerstein as directing the states to ac-
celerate existing procedures for processing an arrestee, when
necessary, to comply with the new standard of "promptness."7 8
70. 427 F. Supp. at 1043. The Dommer court emphasized the importance
of promptness and neutrality in determining probable cause for arrest when it
declared that it would "not allow injustice to infect a criminal system which
prescribes fairness and neutrality at all phases." Id.
71. IND. CODE § 18-1-11-8 (1974) (currently enacted as IND. CODE § 36-8-3-
11 (1981)) requires that "the magistrate review the basis for arrest not later
than twenty-four (24) hours after it occurs." Dommer, 427 F. Supp. at 1045.
72. 427 F. Supp. at 1046. The court allowed an exception when Sunday in-
tervened, in which case the police could hold an individual for a maximum of
48 hours. Id.
73. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
74. 699 F.2d 1023 (9th Cir. 1983) (per curiam).
75. Id. at 1025. The court structured a guideline, attempting to define the
limits imposed by Gerstein. In this case, the evidence established that no more
than 10 hours were needed to complete the "administrative steps incident to
arrest." Id.
76. Id. at 1025 (quoting Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 114 (1975)). The
defendants argued, however, that Gerstein imposed no absolute time limits,
thus permitting the states to meet the constitutional standard using whatever
procedures it deemed necessary. Id Although the Bernard court conceded
this argument, it determined that Gerstein provided a definition of a prompt
determination by a magistrate. Id. The court concluded that any detention be-
yond a brief period required a determination of probable cause by a neutral
magistrate. Id
77. Id. at 1026. The court asserted that "protection of the constitutional
right of persons who may be detained without probable cause is entitled to pri-
ority over affording an opportunity for earlier release" to those arrested with
warrants. Id.
78. Id at 1025. The Bernard court noted that "[t]he Supreme Court recog-
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In Sanders v. City of Houston,79 the court observed that
the need to obtain accurate information about the arrestee
along with other potential evidence were high priorities,80 but
still concluded that due process requires a probable cause deter-
mination as soon as possible and not later than twenty-four
hours after the arrest.8'
Other jurisdictions have established that in a specific case,
holding arrestees for less than twenty-four hours without a
probable cause determination may be a constitutional viola-
tion.82 In Gramenos v. Jewel Cos.,8 3 the court determined that a
warrantless detention of four hours for a non-violent misde-
meanor might be a fourth amendment violation.84
In contrast to the trend of imposing strict time limits under
Gerstein, the court in Lively v. Cullinane8 5 interpreted Ger-
stein as advocating a standard of reasonableness requiring po-
lice procedures to be the least restrictive means necessary to
process arrestees during the pre-arraignment period.86 As soon
nized that some 'acceleration' of existing state procedures might be required to
comply with Gerstein." Id
79. 543 F. Supp. 694 (S.D. Tex. 1982), aff'd mem, 741 F.2d 1379 (5th Cir.
1984).
80. Considering the administrative and law enforcement matters the po-
lice handle daily for any specific case, a delay in presenting arrestees to the
magistrate may be considered reasonable. Id at 702.
81. Id. In Rodgers v. Lincoln Towing Serv., 771 F.2d 194 (7th Cir. 1985),
the court held that a delay of "ten hours is not so long that it 'shocks the con-
science' of the court." Id at 199 (quoting Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165,
172 (1952)). But the processing time of 10 1/2 hours was considered negligence
by the Rodgers court, which held that tort remedies were adequate for individ-
uals seeking redress for the deprivation by state officials of due process rights.
Id at 198-99. See also In re Walters, 15 Cal. 3d 738, 750, 543 P.2d 607, 616, 126
Cal. Rptr. 239, 248 (1975) (deciding that the state must determine probable
cause no later than during arraignment).
82. The Bernard court explained that "[d]etention for less than 24 hours
without a probable cause hearing would violate the fourth amendment in a
particular case if the circumstances were such that the administrative steps
leading to a magistrate's determination reasonably could have been completed
in less than 24 hours." 699 F.2d at 1025.
83. 797 F.2d 432, 437 (7th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1028 (1987) (de-
termining that when the post-arrest administrative steps have been completed,
the police must take the suspect before a magistrate to establish probable
cause or must let him go).
84. Id. The Gramenos court held that even a four hour delay in taking a
shoplifting arrestee before a magistrate must be examined to determine if the
arresting officers performed diligently. Id See also Llaguno v. Mfingey, 763
F.2d 1560, 1568 (7th Cir. 1985) (holding that an arrestee cannot be detained in-
definitely while police attempt to establish probable cause).
85. 451 F. Supp. 1000 (D.D.C. 1978).
86. Id. at 1005. The Lively court noted that a court applying the reasona-
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as the police satisfy their administrative needs in an efficient
manner, the court argued, Gerstein prevents them from further
detaining the individual.8 7 At that point, the court concluded,
fourth amendment rights outweigh police interests and the
state violates the fourth amendment.8 8
II. THE SECOND CIRCUIT'S DECISION IN
WILLIAMS V. WARD
The Second Circuit in Williams v. Ward8 9 became the
first court to interpret Gerstein to allow detention, for adminis-
trative ease, for up to seventy-two hours before determining
probable cause. ° The court explained that the fourth amend-
ment requires the state to measure the "promptness" of a prob-
able cause hearing91 by the totality of the processes afforded
the arrestee.92
The Williams court grounded its balancing approach on
five propositions. First, the court reasoned that Gerstein did
not require a uniform system of criminal procedure among the
states, permitting New York to establish its own guidelines. 93
Second, the court noted that the Supreme Court already per-
bleness standard must take into consideration general interests of the police
such as keeping internal records, making accurate records of the arrest and al-
leged crime(s), searching the arrestee, or preventing the destruction of evi-
dence. Id. When these needs are met in an official manner, there is no reason
to detain the individual. Id. See also Doulin v. City of Chicago, 662 F. Supp.
318, 334 (N.D. Ill. 1986) (holding that the practical effects of fingerprint clear-
ing unjustifiably exceeded the "brief period" needed to complete the "adminis-
trative steps incident to the arrests" where other faster methods were
available to acquire essential information), rev'd on other grounds sub nom.
Robinson v. City of Chicago, 868 F.2d 959 (7th Cir. 1989).
87. 451 F. Supp. at 1005. The Lively court determined that the interests of
the police in preventing crime are not as significant after a warrantless arrest
during the period in which the arrestee is being held, because the core guaran-
tee of the fourth amendment then becomes paramount over the interests of
the police. Id. at 1004.
88. Id, at 1005.
89. 845 F.2d 374 (2d Cir. 1988), cert denied, 109 S. Ct. 818 (1989).
90. See supra note 57 and accompanying text for decisions to the contrary.
91. The Williams court argued that Gerstein intended the probable cause
hearing to take place as soon as possible under conditions that are assumed to
be "relatively ideal." 845 F.2d at 385-86. The court asserted that these proce-
dural conditions were not ideal in New York City, and that the fourth amend-
ment did not require New York City to establish an "ideal" arraignment
system. Id. at 389.
92. Id. at 386. The Williams court looked at the procedural flexibility al-
lowed the states by Gerstein, along with Gerstein's acknowledgment that extra
procedures require additional time. Id,
93. Id. at 383. The Williams court observed that the Court in Gerstein
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mitted detention of up to seventy-two hours before the deter-
mination of probable cause for juvenile arrestees.9 4 Third, the
Williams court argued that New York City's arraignment sys-
tem provided more procedural benefits95 than the minimal ex
parte 96 procedure mandated by Gerstein,97 and that these bene-
fits justified the detention of individuals from arrest to arraign-
ment for up to seventy-two hours.98 Fourth, the court
perceived New York City to be unique because of its quantity of
arrests and problematic traffic conditions which cause delays in
transporting prisoners between facilities.9 9 The court also felt
that New York City's arraignment system was complex °° and
differed from other criminal justice systems. 1 Finally, the
court assumed that a probable cause determination within
twenty-four hours of arrest would require an additional hearing
anticipated some degree of flexibility and experimentation in procedure by the
states in regard to the structure of the probable cause hearing. I&
94. Id, at 388. In Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253 (1984), the Court held that
a finding of probable cause was not constitutionally required at the initial ap-
pearance of the juvenile arrestee, but rather could take place up to 72 hours
afterwards. Id at 281.
95. New York City's arraignment system provides an adversarial hearing,
with the accused present and accompanied by counsel. The final disposition of
the case may be made at the hearing, with counsel plea bargaining or negotiat-
ing bail or other conditions of pretrial release. Williams, 845 F.2d at 387.
96. An ex parte judicial proceeding is brought for the benefit of one party
only, without notice to the adverse party. BLACK's LAW DICIoNARY 517 (5th
ed. 1979). An ex parte probable cause hearing is held without the arrestee be-
ing notified or present. Id
97. Gerstein explained that a magistrate could determine probable cause
"in a nonadversary proceeding on hearsay and written testimony." Gerstein v.
Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 120 (1975): The arrestee need not be present at the hear-
ing. I-
98. Id The Court based this conclusion in part on the fact that the Model
Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure, as cited in Gerstein, approved of a deter-
mination of probable cause within 72 hours of arrest. Id at 124 n.25. See
supra notes 42-46 and accompanying text (discussing the Model Code).
99. The court identified New York City as unusual due to its volume of
arrests (over 200,000 annually) and exceedingly poor traffic conditions, noting
that any system involving the transport of arrestees or documents in New
York City could not operate promptly. Williams, 845 F.2d at 381.
100. The court reasoned that coordination of attorneys, judicial officers,
computerized identification systems, and transport from one jail to another
while awaiting the hearing precludes predictable efficiency. Id at 382.
101. Id at 386. The majority in Williams noted that other courts deciding
the same issue, all holding that probable cause hearings must immediately fol-
low completion of the administrative steps incident to arrest, failed to consider
the "totality of the processes afforded the arrestees by the particular criminal
justice system." Id at 386 n.15.
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between the time of arrest and arraignment,10 2 thereby length-
ening the detention periods for the majority of the arrestees. 0 3
The Williams court then concluded that the administrative
costs and consequences of insisting that probable cause for
arrest be determined within twenty-four hours were too
burdensome. 0 4
In rendering its decision, the Second Circuit asserted that
the findings of the district court - that seven hours was suffi-
cient time to complete the steps incident to arrest and that
twenty-four hours was sufficient to complete all administrative
steps for a New York City arraignment under present proce-
dures 0 5 - were legal conclusions permitting de novo review. 06
The Second Circuit reasoned that the district court's imposition
of a twenty-four hour time limit was "a fortiori inconsistent
with Gerstein and Schall."'10 7
In dissent, Judge Stewart focused on Gerstein's require-
ment that a probable cause determination be "prompt."'08 Not-
ing that the Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure
provides for an initial hearing within twenty-four hours, Judge
Stewart pointed out that New York has no such procedure L0 9
Of greatest concern to Judge Stewart was the majority's will-
ingness to overturn the district court's factual findings.
Although agreeing with the district court's findings concerning
the city's ability to institute quicker procedures, Judge Stewart
would have remanded the case for further factfinding. 10 If
upon remand it became clear that the city could not achieve
faster procedures, Judge Stewart felt that Gerstein would allow
a somewhat longer period than twenty-four hours."' 1 Even in
that event, however, Judge Stewart believed the seventy-two
102. The court commented that it would be necessary to add more than
200,000 hearings. Id- at 388.
103. Id The court expressed concern that only a small portion of the ar-
restees would "benefit from the Gerstein minimal ex parte hearing in light of
the easy requirements of probable cause." Id
104. Id at 390.
105. Williams v. Ward, 671 F. Supp. 225, 226 (S.D.N.Y. 1987), rev'd, 845 F.2d
374 (2d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 818 (1989).
106. Williams, 845 F.2d at 382.
107. Id. The court felt these cases clearly accepted as constitutional the
possibility of up to three days of detention prior to a determination of probable
cause. Id.
108. 845 F.2d at 392 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
109. Id. at 393.




hour period was "excessive."" 12
III. APPLICATION OF THE GERSTEIN STANDARD AND
THE CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEE OF A
PROMPT DETERMINATION OF
PROBABLE CAUSE
The Second Circuit's opinion in Williams is unsatisfactory
because it treats the individual's fourth amendment guarantee
of an ex parte probable cause determination as a fungible
right.1 3 By its very nature, a constitutional right is guaranteed
and not subject to alteration according to the particular admin-
istrative desires and needs of each jurisdiction.114 Additionally,
the court's reliance on Schall1- 5 is inappropriate because Schall
addressed only the issue of the preventive detention of
juveniles.116
A. THE PRIORITY OF FOURTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS
The framers of the Constitution rebelled against the old
common law practice of allowing the police to search and arrest
on suspicion only,117 and instead applied the probable cause
standard to searches and seizures."L8 The warrant clause 91 of
112. Id.
113. The Gerstein Court specifically held that the fourth amendment re-
quires a judicial determination of probable cause promptly after a warrantless
arrest, and as a prerequisite to any extended restraint of liberty. Gerstein v.
Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 114, 125 (1975).
114. See United States v. United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 315-16
(1972) (noting that fourth amendment rights should not be "weighed" against
administrative efficiency).
115. Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253 (1984).
116. Id at 274. The Court noted that the Family Court Act allows preven-
tive detention of juveniles in order to protect "both the juvenile and society
from the hazards of pretrial crime." Id
117. Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 100 (1959). Several state constitu-
tions and declarations of rights adopted in the mid-1770s disapproved of gen-
eral warrants. One state admonished that "all general warrants to search
suspected places, or to apprehend suspected persons, without naming or
describing the place, or the person in special - are illegal, and ought not to be
granted." Id at 100-01 (quoting MARYLAND DECLARATION OF RIGHTS art.
XXIII (1776)).
118. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 168, 175 (1948). The Brinegar
Court interpreted probable cause to be practical and nontechnical, designed to
accommodate the opposing interests of individual freedom and crime control.
The Court feared that a lower standard would expose law-abiding citizens to
the "mercy of the officers' whim or caprice." Id at 176.
119. The fourth amendment states that "no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause." U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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the fourth amendment is not a convenience to be "weighed"
against the efficiency of the criminal procedure system in a par-
ticular jurisdiction,120 but rather is a check to prevent errors 2 1
by the law enforcement community. 122 This check is essential
to ensure that those handling investigative and prosecutorial
duties are not also responsible for deciding the constitutionality
of their own behavior.12 3 Without this check, arbitrary police
action would imperil constitutionally guaranteed individual
freedoms.124
120. United States v. United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 315 (1971). In
discussing the warrant clause of the fourth amendment, the Court noted the
clause has been
a valued part of our constitutional law for decades, and it has deter-
mined the result in scores and scores of cases in courts all over this
country. It is not an inconvenience to be somehow "weighed" against
the claims of police efficiency. It is, or should be, an important work-
ing part of our machinery of government, operating as a matter of
course to check the "well-intentioned but mistakenly overzealous ex-
ecutive officers" who are a part of any system of law enforcement.
Id at 315-16 (quoting Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 481 (1971)).
121. Brinegar, 338 U.S. at 182 (Jackson, J., dissenting). In discussing police
mistakes, Justice Jackson eloquently observed that "the authority which we
concede to conduct searches and seizures without warrant may be exercised by
the most unfit and ruthless officers as well as by the fit and responsible, and
resorted to in case of petty misdemeanors as well as in the case of the gravest
felonies." Id at 182.
122. In Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948), Justice Jackson ex-
plained why the fourth amendment has such strict requirements for searches
and seizures. He stated:
The point of the Fourth Amendment, which often is not grasped by
zealous officers, is not that it denies law enforcement the support of
the usual inferences which reasonable men draw from evidence. Its
protection consists in requiring that those inferences be drawn by a
neutral and detached magistrate instead of being judged by the officer
engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime.
I& at 13-14.
123. See Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 168, 181 (1948) (Jackson, J., dis-
senting). Justice Jackson emphasized that the right to be protected from un-
reasonable searches and seizures is one of the most difficult to protect, because
law enforcement officers themselves are those primarily responsible for invad-
ing these rights. He concluded that the judiciary provides the only enforce-
ment available in these circumstances. Ida
124. Justice Frankfurter observed:
A democratic society, in which respect for the dignity of all men is
central, naturally guards against the misuse of the law enforcement
process. Zeal in tracking down crime is not in itself an assurance of
soberness of judgment. Disinterestedness in law enforcement does
not alone prevent disregard of cherished liberties. Experience has
therefore counseled that safeguards must be provided against the dan-
gers of the overzealous as well as the despotic. The awful instruments
of the criminal law cannot be entrusted to a single functionary. The
complicated process of criminal justice is therefore divided into differ-
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The fourth amendment allows deprivation of an individ-
ual's liberty when there is probable cause to believe that a
crime was committed and that the suspect committed it.125
Even though a neutral judicial officer determines probable
cause after, rather than before, a warrantless arrest,12 6 the po-
lice still must have the requisite probable cause prior to making
the arrest.127 An arrest made solely to further police investiga-
tion is an arrest without probable cause and the arrestee must
be released. 28
The Supreme Court has held that fourth amendment pro-
tections may be lessened only when the state's compelling in-
terest in community safety becomes paramount, prevailing over
an individual's liberty interest.129 In particular circumstances,
for example, police may stop and frisk a dangerous suspect on
only an articulable suspicion, 30 or may make a public arrest on
probable cause without first acquiring an arrest warrant.' 31
Significantly, however, Williams apparently is the first court to
hold that constitutional guarantees may be compromised to
such an extent merely to ease an administrative burden.
ent parts, responsibility for which is separately vested in the various
participants upon whom the criminal law relies for its vindication.
McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 343 (1943). See also Hall, The Basic Di-
lemma of Criminal Procedure, in CRIME, LAw, AND Soci=r 231, 234 (1971)
(stating that when individuals are protected from the "indiscriminate and irra-
tional exercise of official power," society also is better protected).
125. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 111 (1975). See also Comment, Pretrial
Detainees Have a Fourth Amendment Right to a Nonadversary, Judicial De-
termination of Probable Cause, 10 VAL. U.L. REv. 199, 204 (1976) (arguing that
community needs dictate that individuals be removed from society if they rep-
resent a threat to the community's physical security).
126. Comment, supra note 125, at 211. The state initiates criminal proceed-
ings against the arrestee to temporarily remove the suspect from society. Id.
at 204.
127. Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 111.
128. Llaguno v. Mingey, 763 F.2d 1560, 1568 (7th Cir. 1985); Dommer v.
Hatcher, 427 F. Supp. 1040, 1045 (N.D. Ind. 1975), rev'd in part on other
grounds sub nom. Dommer v. Crawford, 653 F.2d 289 (7th Cir. 1981) (per
curiam). Law enforcement officers are never authorized to take away a per-
son's liberty while attempting to establish probable cause. Llaguno, 763 F.2d
at 1568.
129. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 751 (1987).
130. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968) (holding that police may stop and
frisk a person whom they reasonably believed to be armed and in the act of
committing a crime).
131. United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 423 (1976). The Court con-
cluded that a requirement of more than probable cause for public arrests
would be too cumbersome to the criminal justice system. 1d. See also Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1967) (determining that a warrant requirement would in-
hibit speedy action of police officers on the beat).
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Justice Jackson proclaimed that fourth amendment protec-
tions belong "in the catalog of indispensable freedoms" 13 2
designed to prevent unfounded interference with individual lib-
erty while still protecting society from criminal activity.133
Fourth amendment safeguards are essential freedoms that can-
not be tailored to fit the administrative desires of a particular
jurisdiction. 134 The Williams court, however, failed to recog-
nize the priority of fourth amendment protections and misin-
terpreted the compromise of Gerstein.3 5
B. THE WILLIAMS COURT'S MISINTERPRETATION OF THE
GERSTEIN COMPROMISE
Courts do not intend to impose useless regulations that
hamper efficient law enforcement processes. 36 Gerstein accord-
ingly encouraged states to adapt their existing pre-trial proce-
dures to incorporate the requirement of a prompt probable
cause determination.137 To obtain the earliest possible judicial
132. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 180 (1948) (Jackson, J.,
dissenting).
133. Id at 176. Accord Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 112 (1975).
134. See supra notes 120-24 and accompanying text.
135. See Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 113-14 (allowing only a brief period of deten-
tion to accomplish the administrative steps incident to arrest). See also Doulin
v. Chicago, 662 F. Supp. 318 (N.D. IlM. 1986) (holding that Chicago's fingerprint
clearing policy did not meet fourth amendment standards), rev'd on other
grounds sub noa. Robinson v. City of Chicago, 868 F.2d 959 (7th Cir. 1989).
The court in Lively v. Cullinane, 451 F. Supp. 1000 (D.D.C. 1978) explained
that:
[t]he balance weighs so heavily in favor of the individual that the po-
lice can justify each delay before presentment only by a strong show-
ing that it is necessitated by a substantial administrative need.... At
the point the police department finishes these administrative tasks,
the Fourth Amendment intervenes so that they are holding an indi-
vidual unconstitutionally until he is presented to a magistrate.
Id, at 1005-06. Lively interpreted the Gerstein standard to be one of reasona-
bleness requiring that the police use the least restrictive procedural means to
process the arrestee. Id at 1005.
136. Dommer v. Hatcher, 427 F. Supp. 1040, 1044 (N.D. Ind. 1975), rev'd in
part on other grounds sub nom,. Dornmer v. Crawford, 653 F.2d 289 (7th Cir.
1981) (per curiam). The Dommer court felt that "[a] criminal procedure
overburdened by cumbersome and purposeless regulations would ultimately
develop into no procedure at all." Id.
137. The Court observed:
Criminal justice is already overburdened by the volume of cases and
the complexities of our system. The processing of misdemeanors, in
particular, and the early stages of prosecution generally are marked
by delays that can seriously affect the quality of justice. A constitu-
tional doctrine requiring adversary hearings for all persons detained
pending trial could exacerbate the problem of pretrial delay.
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determination of probable cause,138 Gerstein allowed the proce-
dure to be informal and nonadversarial, 139 noting that police
might not be able to hold a more complex hearing promptly af-
ter arrest.140 Gerstein thus struck a compromise between the
competing goals of individual liberty and crime control.
The Williams court misinterpreted the scope of the flexi-
bility and experimentation allowed the states under Ger-
stein. 41 Gerstein specifies that an ex parte hearing for
probable cause determination is mandatory, but may be com-
bined with existing state procedures'4 for setting bail or estab-
lishing other conditions for pretrial release.143 The key to
understanding the intent of the Gerstein court, however, lies
with the directive that whatever procedures states choose to
adopt, they must include a judicial determination of probable
cause for the arrest promptly after a warrantless arrest and
prior to any extended restraint of liberty.1 "
420 U.S. at 122 n.23.
138. Id. at 114. Requiring a brief time period for a probable cause determi-
nation is an equitable trade-off for allowing the probable cause standard to jus-
tify detaining an arrestee and for permitting that determination to be ex parte.
139. Id at 120. See Thomas, The Poisoned Fruit of Pretrial Detention, 61
N.Y.U. L. REv. 413, 448 (1986) (reasoning that Gerstein implies that prompt-
ness is measured in hours rather than days). The Gerstein Court justified the
informal procedure by the minimal nature and lesser consequences of the
probable cause determination itself, noting that the determination does not re-
quire the "fine resolution of conflicting evidence that a reasonable-doubt or
even a preponderance standard demands." Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 121.
140. Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 120. The Court observed that "as the hearing as-
sumes increased importance and the procedures become more complex, the
likelihood that it can be held promptly after arrest diminishes." Id.
141. The Gerstein Court recognized the variety of criminal procedure sys-
tems existing throughout the states, assuming that the states would integrate
the probable cause determination into their existing pretrial detention proce-
dure. Id. at 123.
142. Id. at 124. The Gerstein Court explained that when existing state pro-
cedures did not meet fourth amendment requirements, adjustments, such as
acceleration of these procedures, would be necessary. Id.
143. Id. The arrestee's initial appearance or presentment traditionally is
combined with a number of procedural benefits for the arrestee. Police in-
form the suspect of the pending charges, advise the suspect of constitutional
rights, and possibly set bail. If the suspect is indigent, the court appoints coun-
sel. This procedure may be merged with a preliminary hearing (sometimes
also called a probable cause hearing) or an arraignment. Procedures vary from
one jurisdiction to another, becoming somewhat confusing when the same
term is used in reference to different procedures. W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL,
supra note 2, at 13-14, 595-96.
144. Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 114, 125. Gerstein mandates "a fair and reliable
determination of probable cause as a condition for any significant pretrial re-
straint of liberty, and this determination must be made by a judicial officer
either before or promptly after arrest." Id at 125 (emphasis added).
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The Williams court attempted to justify prearraignment
detention of up to three days by balancing the totality of the
processes provided the arrestee with the "promptness" of the
arrestee's release.145 This reasoning is flawed because the
Supreme Court already has done the necessary balancing, de-
termining that a prompt nonadversarial ex parte probable
cause hearing to protect innocent arrestees from lengthy incar-
ceration is a higher priority under the fourth amendment than
a more thorough, but complex procedure leading to lengthier
detention for all arrestees.146
The additional procedural benefits offered by New York
City do not address the concerns of those arrested without
probable cause for arrest. The right to consult an attorney is a
sixth amendment requirement that arrestees are entitled to in
any event. 47 Plea bargaining and pretrial release programs are
useless to those who have been arrested erroneously because
they should never proceed to that stage of the criminal process.
The procedural benefits New York City offers arrestees thus
are, in many cases, either already guaranteed or irrelevant. Be-
yond these practical shortcomings, the city offers little support
for its assertion that procedural benefits somehow offset and
mitigate what are otherwise unconstitutional detentions.
The Williams court circumvented Gerstein by arguing that
in New York City, meeting the Gerstein requirements would
lengthen detention periods.148 Although the Williams court as-
sumed that an earlier judicial determination of probable cause
145. Williams, 845 F.2d at 386-88.
146. Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 120, 122. "Promptness" is the balance Gerstein
envisioned, already a compromise between instantaneously and never. The
Court in Gerstein was concerned that if the hearing for determining probable
cause became more complex and important, it would less likely be held
promptly after the arrest. I&L at 120. The Williams court argued that "any
attempt to insert the requested mandatory probable cause hearing between
arrest and arraignment will actually work enormous harm.... [O]ver 200,000
such hearings annually would be necessary, and because they would be held
before the same judges who must thereafter conduct arraignments, the time
between arrest and arraignment would be increased for all but those few who
are released for lack of probable cause. The relief requested would thus actu-
ally lengthen detention periods.. .." 845 F.2d at 388-89.
147. U.S. CONST. amend VI. Courts have interpreted this right to include
the appointment of counsel to indigent arrestees once they are in police cus-
tody. See W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, supra note 2, at 473-81.
148. Williams, 845 F.2d at 388-89. The court argued that fewer arrestees
would "benefit from the Gerstein minimal ex parte hearing in light of the




must be made at a separate hearing,' 49 Gerstein requires only a
nonadversarial ex parte decision incorporated into existing pro-
cedures. The nature of this hearing is informal and similar to
the procedure for obtaining a warrant. Consequently it would
not cause significant delay.150 The Williams perspective slights
the binding power of Gerstein151 and the individual nature 5 2 of
the constitutional right protecting a suspect from an extended
restraint of liberty without a neutral magistrate's determina-
tion of probable cause for arrest.153
C. THE WILLIAMS COURT'S ERRONEOUS USE OF OTHER CASES
INTERPRETING GERSTEIN
1. Unfounded Reliance on Schall v. Martin
The Williams court erroneously relied on Schall's accept-
ance of up to a seventy-two hour delay between a juvenile's ini-
tial appearance 5 4 and a probable cause determination 155 to
149. Williams, 845 F.2d at 388.
150. Although jurisdictions frequently determine probable cause for arrest
during the arrestee's initial appearance before a judicial officer, Gerstein does
not require such a determination. 420 U.S. at 120 (stating that probable cause
traditionally has been decided by a magistrate in a nonadversarial ex parte
proceeding). The Court observed that "[t]he use of an informal procedure is
justified not only by the lesser consequences of a probable cause determination
but also by the nature of the determination itself." Id at 121.
151. Id. at 114. The Court felt that:
[When the stakes are this high, the detached judgment of a neutral
magistrate is essential if the fourth amendment is to furnish meaning-
ful protection from unfounded interference with liberty. Accordingly,
we hold that the fourth amendment requires a judicial determination
of probable cause as a prerequisite to extended restraint of liberty fol-
lowing arrest.
Id.
152. Justice Powell has observed that an arrest "is a serious personal intru-
sion regardless of whether the person seized is guilty or innocent.... [N]o de-
cision that he should go free can come quickly enough to erase the invasion of
his privacy that already will have occurred." United States v. Watson, 423 U.S.
411, 428 (1975) (Powell, J., concurring).
153. Bernard v. City of Palo Alto, 699 F.2d 1023, 1025 (9th Cir. 1983) (per
curiam). Gerstein specifically addresses the rights of a minority when it re-
quires that the group of innocent suspects who are arrested without probable
cause deserve to be released from custody promptly following their erroneous
arrest and before any significant restraint takes place. Gerstein, 420 U.S. at
114.
154. The initial appearance provides the juvenile with appropriate safe-
guards such as notice of the charges, the appointment of a guardian, and the
opportunity to attack the sufficiency of the delinquency petition, thereby es-
tablishing a lack of probable cause. Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 275-76
(1984).
155. Id. at 275. If the juvenile has not established a lack of probable cause
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conclude that prearraignment detention of seventy-two hours is
constitutionally permissible for adults.156 Schall is inapplicable
to Williams because the two cases address different issues.
The Schall Court addressed the narrow issue of the constitu-
tionality of juvenile preventive detention following a finding
that there exists a "serious risk" that the juvenile would com-
mit future crimes if released immediately.15 7 The Williams
court, on the other hand, was called on to determine what con-
stituted a prompt determination of probable cause following
the warrantless arrests of adults, whose seizure was pre-
sumptively unreasonable, in light of fourth amendment
protections.158
The Williams court failed to acknowledge the differing in-
terests of the state in the preventive detention of juveniles 5 9
and in the administrative detention of adult arrestees prior to
the determination that there was probable cause for their
arrest.160 In dealing with the preventive detention of juveniles,
the state, because of its position as parens patriae or legal
guardian, has an inherent interest in promoting the welfare of
juveniles and protecting them from their own behavior.' 6 ' By
contrast, the detention of the arrestees in Williams must be
brief because these arrestees are presumed to have been unrea-
sonably seized until probable cause for their arrest is deter-
at the initial hearing, the Schall Court specifically permits a delay of 72 hours
or until the next court day, whichever is sooner, for an appointed guardian or
counsel to appear with the juvenile before the court. Id-
156. Williams, 845 F.2d at 389. The Schall Court was not addressing the
constitutionality of delaying a juvenile's initial appearance for 72 hours.
Schall, 467 U.S. at 258 n.5.
157. 467 U.S. at 263. The Schall Court noted that the state has a legitimate
and compelling interest in protecting the community from crime. The major-
ity observed that juveniles are more likely to commit crimes because minors
may be most susceptible to negative influences. Id at 266.
158. 845 F.2d at 375. Preventive detention is not the key issue in Williams,
which addresses the concerns of the group of arrestees not yet found guilty of
any crime, but who nonetheless are imprisoned for up to three days. Id
159. The Schall Court explained that juveniles have a lesser interest in
freedom from institutional constraints than do adults because they always are
under the protective custody of either their parents, or the state as parens pa-
triae. 467 U.S. at 265.
160. This was the particular focus of Gerstein. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S.
103, 114 (1975).
161. The Schall Court observed that a juvenile proceeding is "fundamen-
tally different from an adult criminal trial" because of the state's "parens pa-
triae interest in 'preserving and promoting the welfare of the child."' 467 U.S.
at 263 (quoting Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 766 (1982)).
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mined.' 62 Preventive detention, then, has little relevance to the
arrestees in Williams,163 because the state's interest in detain-
ing arrestees prior to probable cause determination is primarily
administrative convenience. 1
The Williams court also overlooked the Schall Court's ob-
servation that the Constitution does not require equal treat-
ment of juveniles and adults because of the state's parens
patriae interest.165 For instance, the state does not imprison
juveniles held after an initial appearance as it does adults,166
but instead confines them in a minimum security facility that
provides educational, counseling, and recreational programs.167
Schall itself thus explains the uniqueness of the juvenile situa-
tion, suggesting its inapplicability to cases like Williams.
2. Misapplication of Other Caselaw and Rules
The Williams court challenged previous judicial interpre-
tations of the Gerstein standard, arguing that prior decisions
did not consider "the totality of the processes afforded the ar-
restees."'168 As previously discussed, this balancing approach is
not acceptable under Gerstein.169 An individual's liberty inter-
est, protected by the fourth amendment, is not a bartering chip
that can be traded for additional procedural benefits. Even ac-
cepting such a premise as true, New York City's alleged bene-
fits are illusory. For example, the right to counsel already is
162. See Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 111-12 (quoting Brinegar v. United States, 338
U.S. 160, 176 (1949)).
163. See generally United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 751 (1987) (hold-
ing that states may preventively detain adults only "[w]hen the government
proves by clear and convincing evidence that an arrestee presents an identified
and articulable threat to an individual or the community").
164. Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 114.
165. The Schall Court noted that "the Constitution does not mandate the
elimination of all differences in the treatment of juveniles. The state has a
'parens patriae interest in preserving and promoting the welfare of the child,'
which makes a juvenile proceeding fundamentally different from an adult
criminal trial." 467 U.S. at 263 (citation omitted).
166. Id at 270. The state cannot, except in unusual circumstances, send
juveniles to a prison or detain them where they would be exposed to adult
criminals. The state provides the juvenile with a "controlled environment"
which "separat[es] him from improper influences pending the speedy disposi-
tion of his case." I&.
167. Id at 271. The Schall Court explained that the conditions of confine-
ment reflect the regulatory purpose of the juvenile statute in question. Fol-
lowing the initial appearance, the juvenile authorities evaluate the juvenile
and place the child in either nonsecure or secure detention. Id-
168. 845 F.2d at 386 n.15.
169. See supra notes 145-50 and accompanying text.
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guaranteed by the sixth amendment, 170 and the opportunity to
plea bargain is of no value to an innocent arrestee who will be
completely exonerated at a probable cause hearing.
Other courts ruling on pre-arraignment detention of ar-
restees have held that detention for more than twenty-four
hours is a violation of an individual's fourth amendment
"rights" because of the undue interference with an individual's
liberty.1 7 1 By holding that seventy-two hours is constitutionally
permissible, Williams makes a significant departure from pre-
vious interpretations of Gerstein.172 The majority in Williams
relied on the Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure 73 to
defend its contention that probable cause need not be deter-
mined within twenty-four hours. The argument, however, is
misleading because it emphasizes that the initial hearing speci-
fied in the Model Code does not require a probable cause deter-
mination' 74 while ignoring the requirement that the hearing be
held within twenty-four hours of arrest. 75 Even though the
Model Code provides that probable cause may be determined
later than the initial hearing, it still requires an initial appear-
ance of the arrested person before a judicial officer within
twenty-four hours of the arrest.176 This appearance guarantees
170. See supra note 147.
171. See supra note 67.
172. See Llaguno v. Mingey, 763 F.2d 1560, 1568 (7th Cir. 1985) (en banc)
(holding that 42 hours exceeds constitutional limits); Mabry v. County of
Kalamazoo, 626 F. Supp. 912, 914 (W.D. Mich. 1986) (holding that 60 hours ex-
ceeds constitutional limits). In Bernard v. City of Palo Alto, 699 F.2d 1023,
1025 (9th Cir. 1983) (per curiam), the court established a benchmark of 24
hours, excluding extenuating circumstances, for the ex parte determination of
probable cause. The Bernard court viewed this as "identifying the outer time
limit in the vast majority of cases." Id. Accord Sanders v. Houston, 543 F.
Supp. 694, 702 (S.D. Tex. 1982) (holding that probable cause must be deter-
mined by a judicial officer no later than 24 hours after arrest), aff'd met., 741
F.2d 1379 (5th Cir. 1984).
173. MODEL CODE, supra note 40, §§ 310.1 to -.2.
174. Section 310.1(6) states that "[t]he court need not determine whether
there is reasonable cause to believe the arrested person committed the crime
of which he is accused, but if the court does determine there is not such rea-
sonable cause it shall discharge the arrested person." MODEL CODE, supra
note 40, § 310.1(6).
175. Section 310.1(1) mandates that an arrestee in custody "shall be
brought before a court at the earliest time after the arrest that a judicial of-
ficer of such court is available and in any event within 24 hours after the
arrest. If such appearance has not taken place within 24 hours after his arrest,
such person shall be released.... ." Id. § 310.(1).
176. Id. §§ 310.1(1), 1(6). Notes to the Model Code explain that at this first
appearance, an arrestee might satisfy a magistrate that he was not guilty of
the crime for which the police had arrested him. Id. § 310.1(6) note.
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that the state will promptly notify the individual of the pending
charges and present an opportunity to demonstrate a lack of
probable cause for the arrest.1 77 The New York City criminal
procedure system does not provide this safeguard.
D. THE WILLIAMS COURT'S FAILURE TO DEFER TO THE
JUDICIAL FACTFINDING OF THE DISTRICT COURT
The analysis in Williams is also problematic because the
court did not properly defer to the factual findings of the lower
court. The lower court found that seven hours was sufficient
time to complete the steps incident to arrest and that twenty-
four hours was sufficient to complete all administrative steps
for a New York arraignment under present procedures. 7 8 A
reviewing court generally cannot set aside findings of fact un-
less it demonstrates that they are clearly erroneous.179 The
findings of fact in Williams cannot be considered clearly erro-
neous, because the state presented no reliable evidence to dis-
pute these facts.'80 Indeed, even the attorneys for New York
City suggested that they could complete the steps from arrest
to arraignment in twenty-four hours.' 8 ' Because the Williams
court disagreed with the findings of fact of the lower court, but
could not overrule them as clearly erroneous, it simply charac-
terized them as "legal conclusions" and overruled them. 8 2 The
177. Id. The Model Code attempts to avoid "unnecessary incarceration and
inconvenience for the arrested person." I&.
178. Williams v. Ward, 671 F. Supp. 225, 226 (S.D.N.Y. 1987), iev'd, 845 F.2d
374 (2d Cir. 1988), cert denied, 109 S. Ct. 818 (1989). The lower court's specific
findings of fact were as follows:
[A] period of seven hours is sufficient to complete all necessary steps
incident to the arrest of the plaintiffs and members of their class, ex-
cept in exceptional circumstances.... [A] period of 24 hours is suffi-
cient for all steps incident to an arrest to be finalized and all steps
necessary for the New York arraignment under present proce-
dures.... [A] period of detention which exceeds 24 hours prior to hav-
ing a probable cause determination by a neutral magistrate violates
the rights of plaintiffs and members of their class under the Fourth
and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution.Id.
179. See, e.g., Stafford v. International Harvester Co., 668 F.2d 142, 147 (2d
Cir. 1981) (citing FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a)).
180. See Williams, 845 F.2d at 395 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
181. This was suggested at a hearing before the district court. Id. at 396
(Stewart, J., dissenting).
182. Id. at 382. The majority designated these findings as "actually legal
conclusions as to how much time is reasonable as a matter of law to carry out
particular phases of the arrest-to-arraignment process." Ia
The dissent noted that "[w]hen a 'district court's account of the evidence is
plausible in light of the record viewed in its entirety, [a] court of appeals may
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validity of the Williams analysis, therefore, is further weak-
ened because the court did not adhere to established appellate
procedure in reviewing findings of the lower court.
IV. A Proposed Solution: The Uniform Twenty-four Hour
Standard
Gerstein v. Pugh8 3 established that the Constitution does
not permit warrantless detention beyond the time needed to
complete the administrative steps incident to arrest.-84 Ger-
stein specifically requires a judicial determination of probable
cause promptly after a warrantless arrest and prior to any ex-
tended restraint of liberty. The constitutional mandate of the
fourth amendment, as defined in Gerstein, requires that a de-
tention pursuant to a warrantless arrest be "brief."'185 One can
infer from the emphasis of the Gerstein Court on the timeliness
of the judicial determination of probable cause that speed is of
the essence.
Courts should interpret Gerstein as mandating that police
provide a nonadversarial ex parte probable cause determination
within twenty-four hours of arrest. 86 This is the type of com-
promise Gerstein envisioned: allowing only a brief detention,
but enough time (even in New York City) to complete the ad-
ministrative steps incident to arrest.8 7 A majority of the courts
addressing this issue already use a twenty-four hour standard
as the outside time limit for the initial hearing to raise probable
cause issues,188 as does the Model Code of Pre-Arraignment
not reverse it even though convinced that had it been sitting as trier of fact, it
would have weighed the evidence differently."' Id. at 395 (Stewart, J., dissent-
ing) (quoting Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 574 (1985)).
183. 420 U.S. 103 (1975).
184. Id. at 114.
185. Id. at 114, 125. The Court emphasized the importance of a prompt de-
termination of probable cause in order for the fourth amendment to "furnish
meaningful protection from unfounded interference with liberty." 1I at 114.
186. The 24-hour standard would apply unless a law enforcement agency
shows that it cannot meet the standard at all, or cannot do so without extreme
expense and inconvenience. The findings in Williams were not sufficient to
justify an exception under this proposed 'standard because the city admitted it
could meet the standard, and did not suffiently demonstrate the extent of its
burden in complying.
187. The Williams court accepted that police in New York City could com-
plete the steps incident to arrest within 24 hours, but maintained that the com-
plexities of the city's arraignment system required more time for a probable
cause hearing. Williams v. Ward, 845 F.2d 374, 389 (2d Cir. 1988), cert denied,
109 S. Ct. 818 (1989).
188. See supra note 67.
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Procedure. 8 9 The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure also
require a hearing within twenty-four hours, where a defendant
could challenge probable cause for a warrantless detention.190
Additionally, commentators have accepted twenty-four hours as
approximating the Gerstein standard.191
Although selection of twenty-four hours as the Gerstein
standard may appear arbitrary, the need for a bright line guide
outweighs this concern.192 Public policy requires that laws be
uniform and predictable: judicial arbitrariness in setting the
standard is preferable to police discretion resulting in excessive
and unnecessary detention.193 The latter may result in discrim-
ination and deprivation of liberty, while the former does little
more than raise academic hackles. Importantly, no law en-
forcement agency (including New York City's) argues that a
twenty-four hour standard is beyond its capability. A twenty-
four hour standard fosters much needed uniformity and pre-
dictability by ensuring that law enforcement officials efficiently
handle their administrative responsibilities, thus maintaining
constitutional safeguards for the liberty of each citizen.
Determining whether the probable cause determination
should be made at arraignment - presently the procedure in
New York City - or at another time, is the prerogative of the
criminal justice system of each jurisdiction.194 Each jurisdiction
thus has the flexibility to tailor a system to meet its own needs.
This can be accomplished without eviscerating the fourth
amendment. Under the proposed standard, a jurisdiction may
189. See supra notes 173-77 and accompanying text.
190. See supra notes 47-49 and accompanying text.
191. See, e.g., W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, supra note 2, at 143. LaFave and
Israel interpret Gerstein to mean that a state must show probable cause "at
least in a day or so and thus cannot be delayed so as to be combined with the
preliminary hearing." Id-
192. It is interesting to note that neither the courts nor the drafters of the
rules give justification for selecting 24 hours as the Gerstein standard, instead
of, say, 29 or 33 hours. Perhaps 24 hours is psychologically appealing because
it constitutes one day. Whatever the reasons, the 24-hour standard is attrac-
tive because it is well-recognized and, although brief, still allows ample time to
complete the administrative steps incident to arrest.
193. Cf Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 162 (1972) (hold-
ing that vague statutes lead to unpredictability and arbitrariness in
enforcement).
194. The inefficiencies present in the New York City criminal justice sys-
tem are distressing, but cannot be used as an excuse for compromising an indi-
vidual's fourth amendment rights. See supra notes 117-135 and accompanying
text. Providing constitutional protections for individuals is a priority of our
criminal justice system, which presumes arrestees have been unreasonably de-
tained until a court determines whether probable cause for detention exists.
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structure its criminal procedures in whatever format is most
convenient and efficient, provided that a probable cause deter-
mination is made within twenty-four hours after the warrant-
less arrest.
CONCLUSION
The length of time a person may be constitutionally de-
tained following a warrantless arrest prior to a probable cause
determination has yet to be clearly defined. Even though the
Supreme Court in Gerstein v. Pugh decided that this determi-
nation must be made "promptly" after arrest, it did not define
what "promptly" means. In Williams v. Ward, the Second Cir-
cuit held that additional procedural benefits afforded arrestees
by the New York City criminal justice system helped justify
their detention for up to seventy-two hours without a probable
cause determination. Williams was flawed primarily because it
improperly compromised an arrestee's constitutional right to a
"prompt" probable cause determination for the sake of admin-
istrative ease.
Establishment of a benchmark time limit of twenty-four
hours allows sufficient time for completion of the administra-
tive steps incident to arrest, while minimizing the imposition on
arrestees' liberty rights. With a twenty-four hour standard,
states no longer would be tempted to implement less costly, but
more time-consuming, administrative procedures, and the con-
stitutional rights of arrestees would be protected in the manner
intended by the framers of the fourth amendment.
Jane H. Settle
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